Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1955

Hance A. Taylor, Erma G. Taylor and Parley P.
Taylor v. Weber County et al : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Skeen, Thurman, Wobsley & Snow; H. G. Christensen; Attorneys for Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Taylor v. Weber County, No. 8343 (Utah Supreme Court, 1955).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2364

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

2 1 1956

FEB

Ul~ L;~f!J:H

Case No. 8343

u. ill u.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HANCE A. TAYLOR, and ERMA G.
TAYLOR, his wife, and PARLEY P.
TAYLOR,

Plaitntiffs 01114 AppeUarnts,

-vs.WEBER COUNTY, a municipal corporation, LYMAN HESS, ARTHUR
BROWN, ~ELMER CARVER, J.
PIER'CE GRAHAM, ELLIS GRIFFIN and GOLDEN NIELSEN,
Defendants (llftd Respovnden.ts.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
SKEEN, T'HURMAN,
WORS.LEY & SNOW
and H. G. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Appellanls.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS __________________________________________________ --------------- 1
STATEMENT OF POINTS·---------------------------------------------------------------

9

ARGUMENT
The Trial Court erred in his refusal to grant plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict as to liability at
the clos·e of all the evidence ........ -----------------------------------II. The Trial Court erred in his Instruction No. 3
which quotes verbatim from the defendants' pretrial statement as to theories of defense which are
not substantiated by any evidenc·e in the case ________________
III. The Trial Court erred in his Instruction No. 6, setting forth "Basic Principles of Drainage Law"-------------IV. The Trial Court erred in his Instruction No. 13,
there being no evidence at all in the record to support the instruction ---------------------------------------------------------V. The Trial Court erred in his refusal to sustain the
objections to the testimony of witness liester England, and further erred in refusing plaintiffs'
motion to strike the testimony of witness Lester
England as to certain matters-----------------------------------------CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------I.

CASES

9

14
17
19

24
28

CITED

Bertolina v. Frates, 89 Ut. 238, 57 P. (2d) 346 ........ -------------------Bruner v. McCarthy, et al, 105 Ut. 399, 142 P. (2d) 649 ............
Buckley v. Cox, 274 P. (2d) 277 (Utah, 1952>-----------------------------Clawson Y. Walgreen Drug Company, 108 Utah 577,
16 2 p. ( 2d) 7 59 ........ -----------------------------------------------------------Davis v. Heiner, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 587 .... ---------------------------------Farmers and Merchant's Savings Bank v. Jensen,
1q Utah 609, 232 P. 1084---------------------------------------------------Hines v. Guie, 25 Arizona 65, 213 P. 395·--------------------------------------Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Ut. 481, 39 P. (2d) 1070--------------------------··
Savage v. Niels•en, 114 Ut. 22, 197 P. ( 2d) 117 ·················-------···Shields v.'"Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307,
10 5 P. ( 2d) 3 4 7 ····----····-----·--·---··-··--·----·-------··--····-··-··------····
Smith v. North Canyon Water Company, 16 Ut. 194, 52 P. 283 ....
State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead,
8 2 Utah 416, 2 5 P. ( 2d) 612................................................

13
15
13
21
16
15
16
13
14
17
18
20

Authorities Cited

17 Am. Jur., Easements, Section 55 ..... ------····-······-····--····-···-·--·····-·
64 Corpus Juris 760 ..........................................................................
Ruling Case Law................................................................................
2 Tiffany on Real Property, 2nd Ed., Section 519 ........................
5 Wigmore on Evid•ence (3rd Ed.) Sec. 1563 ................................

18
20
20
13
26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HANCE A. TAYLOR, and ERMA G.
TAYLOR, his wife, and PARLEY P.
rAYLOR,
Plaimtiffs a;nd Appellarnts,

-vs.Case No. 8343
WEBER COUNTY, a municipal corporation, LYMAN HESS, ARTHUR
BROWN, ELMER CARVER, J.
PIERCE GRAHAM, ELLIS GRIFFIN and GOLDEN NIELSEN,
D.efendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT· OF Fk0T8
This action was brought in the District Court for
Weber County by Hance A. Taylor and E'rma G. Taylor,
his wife, and Parley P. Taylor, the owners of two adjo~n
ing tracts of land, over which the defendant, Weber
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County, sought to acquire, oYer a period of years a right
to drain a large quantity of water and to clean and enlarge a drainage ditch. The County, through its Commissioners, had negotiated for some time with plaintij'l's
for pennission to conduct the water from a ponded area
or swmnp north of Center Street in Plain City, Utah,
which water had backed up against and over a newly
constructed highway, through the drainage ditch constructed by the predecessors of plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs during these negotiations had resisted
the claim of the County that the drain through plaintiffs'
property was a natural one, and had further resisted
the claim of the County that it had acquired rights to use
and do work on the drain ·by moving in a dragline or other
machinery and enlarging and deepening the drain to
handle an increased flow of water.
On the 20th day of November, 1953, after negotiations had failed, the defendants, Graham, Griffin, and
Nielsen, under the direction of the defendants: County
Commissioners Hess, Brown and Carver, cut the fence
of Hance A. Taylor, and with a large draglinc moved
onto his property and cleaned and deepened the drain, although express permission to enter said property had
been repeatedly denied the County and its agents by Mr.
Taylor.
Because of the refusal of the T-aylors to give permission to the County, the Sheriff of Weber County was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
directed ·by the Commissioners to go to the Taylor farm
and stand guard while the dredge line was passed over
the fence and taken down through the drainage ditch
area, over a second fence into Parley P. Taylor's farm,
then back again through the ditch across the property of
plaintiffs, through the fence again and out.
This action was grounded in trespass for damages
and for a permanent injunction against further trespass
and the use of the Taylor properties hy the County or its
agents.
The answer of the defendants to this action in its
essence was a general deniaf, but at the pre-trial conference the defendants were required to set out a statement of facts which they expected to prove at the trial.
This statement indicates that defendants relied upon
their having acquired a right of way over the plaintiffs'
land by prescription, or natural right of drainage, which
right of way included the right to go onto the T'aylor
farms a11d clean the drain. Plaintiffs' complaint was
amended?to inc'lude an allegation of punitive damages
based on the deliberate and intentional forceable entry
"·
of the Taylor
farms by the defendants in open defiance
of the plaintiffs' rights.
At the trial plaintiffs introduced evidence of their
ownership of the land in question, established the forceful entry of their properties 'by the defendants, and further introduced evidence of the resultant damage to their
farms.
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The p1aintiffs introduced as Exhibit C the photograph set out herein, showing the condition of the drain
as left by the dragline, and the plaintiff, Hance A.
Taylor, measuring the depth of the drain aftPr the
County had finished its dredging operation and had
thrown along the sides of the ditch bank the materials
ae('umulated in the 'bottom of the drain.

The ownership of the property by plaintiffs was established without contradictory testimony, and the estimate of the damage done by the trespass with its attendant results of cutting and washing away plaintiffs'
ground was not controverted by the defendants.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Defendants' evidence at the trial was directed to a
showing that the drain had not been appreciably enlarged
by the recent dredging operation. Evidence was also introduced by the defendants, apparently in an effort to
establish the claimed right of way to maintain the drain
across plaintiffs' farms. Defendants' evidence was intended to show that the drain was viewed by the County
as a necessary channel through which to divert water
which had accumulated in a pond north of Center Street
and which had, during the spring of the year, overflowed
onto the highway (T. 106, 130). No evidence was introduced to the effect that the drain across plaintiffs' farms
was.the natural drain for the pond area.
Lester England, a witness for defendants, testified
to the effect that in his youth he had heard his father,
now deceased, say that the Englands had purchased
the right to go onto the Taylor farm and clean the drain,
and had at one time paid a predecessor of Hance A. and
Parley P. Taylor, the sum of $20.00 for the right to use
the draiil, (T. 187).
l
Defindants further attempted to show that on various occasions through the years County employees had
cleaned the drain. Lester England testified that around
1918 the Taylor drain had been cleaned by one Louis
Shummers, a County employee (T. 191, 192). Mr.
England admitted on cross-examination that he remembered when the ''drain" was just a "swale" through
the plaintiffs' farms (T. '216). Witness Delwin Sharp
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for the defendants, testified that in 1918 as Road Supervisor of vV e:ber County, he had directed the deepening
of the 'raylor drain and the putting in of a culvert under
a canal north of the T~aylor farms (T. 227). His testimony was that he had hired John H. Taylor, the father
of the plaintiff, Hance A. Taylor, to assist in this work
(T. 229). A County employee, Ernest Jensen, testified
that he operated a dragline on the Taylor properties in
1928 ( T. 23 5). Witness Jesse Singleton testified that he
personally cleaned the drain in 1933 as Road Supervisor (T. 244) at which time he saw no one and spoke to
no one on the Taylor farms ('T. 255), and further testified that in 1935 he knew of work being done on the drain
by the P.W.A. as part of a mosquito abatement project
(T. 245). Again in 1938 Singleton hired plaintiff Parley
P. Taylor and his son to dig out the cattails from the
drain (T. 247), and, finally, in '1943 he again.cleaned the
drain with a drag line ( T. 25'1), but on cross-examination
he stated that on this occasion he did not enter the Parley
P. Taylor farm ('T. 257). None of defendants' witnesses testified that they had gone onto the Taylbr farms
without seeking permission of the T'aylors to do so.
1

Plaintiffs' re:buttal was to the effect that the drain
was constructed by the Taylors in 1913 or 1914 (T. 283)
by means of a slip scraper and plow, and that the drain
at that time was not more than a foot deep (T. 284).
The drain had originally been constructed to· relieve the
land of excess water, when the snow would melt and the
Plain City canal broke (T. 283, 31'2), and at that time
1
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carried no water fr01n the pond north of Center Street.
Plaintiffs' rebuttal further showed that in 19'28, County
Commissioner Randal had promised the Taylors that
if they would let the County clean the drain, the County
would tile it at a later time (T. 286). Permission was
given the P.W.A. to enter the Taylor farms because of
the mosquito project and the obvious resultant benefit
to the properties to be rid of the 1nosquito nuisance ( T.
288). Again in 1943 Commissioner McEntire promised
the Taylors that if permission were given the County to
enter the farms, the County would tile the drain (T. 290).
This was not denied by defendants. Permission was accordingly given, hut conditioned on the tiling, which never
did occur. A meeting of the County Commissioners and
interested farmers occurred at the County Building in
1948, and at that time the County Commissioners again
expressed the desire to acquire a right of way through
the T·aylor farms in exchange for tiling (T. '292). The
cost of tiling was considered, and proved to be in excess
of what. the Commissioners felt they could expend, and
no further progress was made in that regard.
Mrs. U rie, mother of Hance A. Taylor, testified that
in 1943, at which time she owned the Hance A. Taylor
farm, she gave the County permission to clean the drain
if they would tile it ('T. 301). She further testified that
she had previously given the P.W.A. permission to enter
the farm and clean the drain as part of the mosquito
a:batement project (T. 301).
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Conunissioner Carver, called by defendants, testified
on cross-exmnination to the effect that Weber County
cleaned the Taylor drain in November, 1953, and that
the Com1nissioners were not at that time acting under
the direction of farmers in the vicinity.
At the close of all the evidence plaintiffs moved for
a directed verdict as to liability (T. 333) on the ground
that it was undisputed that the County had forcefully
entered the plaintiffs' farms and cleaned the drains without plaintiffs' permission, and further upon the ground
that defendants had introduced no clear and satisfactory
evidence to support the right of way claimed. Plaintiffs'
motion was denied and the matter was submitted to the
jury on special interrogatories and a general verdict.
The jury answered in the affirmative Interrogatory
No. 1, which read as follows :
"Do you find from the evidence that Weber
County on November 20, 195'3, had a right of way
across the plaintiffs Ranee .A. Taylor, ,Erma G.
Taylor and Parley P. T·aylors' land for the purpose of draining water, through the drain then
existing on plaintiffs' land and for cleaning and
maintaining that water drain~ .Answer yes or no."
The verdict of the jury was for defendants and against
plaintiffs, no cause of action.
On March 30, 195·5, this appeal was taken from the
judgment of the trial court based upon the general verdict and the jury's answers to the special interrogatories.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS REFUSAL TO
GRANT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AS TO LIABILITY AT THE CLOSE OF ALL THE
EVIDENCE.

II. THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTION
NO. 3 WHICH QUOTES VERBATIM FROM THE DEFENDANTS' PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT AS TO THEORIES OF DEFENSE WHICH ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY ANY EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTION
NO. 6, SETTING FORTH "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DRAINAGE LAW."
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS
NO. 13, THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE AT ALL IN THE
RECORD TO SUPPORT THE INSTRUCTION.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS REFUSAL TO
SUSTAIN PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE TESTIMONY
OF WITNESS LESTER ENGLAND, AND FURTHER ERRED
IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS LESTER ENGLAND AS TO
CERTAIH MATTERS.

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS REFUSAL TO
GRANT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AS TO LIABILITY AT THE CLOSE OF ALL THE
EVIDENCE.

The evidence of the defendants failed to sustain
any one of the theories advanced at pre-trial by which
the County claimed to have acquired a right of way over
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plaintiffs' far1ns. The record discloses no testimony
whatsoever concerning the Taylor drain being the ''natural drain" for the area north of Center Street. On
the contrary all the evidence concerning the origin of the
Taylor drain is to the effect that it was originally constructed by the predecessors of the Taylors by slipseraper
and plow in approxi111ately the year 1913 to relieve the
inm1ediate area of surplus water. Defendants' witnesses
testified that the pond north of Center Street was located
in a "saucer-like" area into which water from the surrounding land flowed, but there was no direct testimony
that the natural course of drainage from that "saucerlike" area was through the Taylor farms. Rather, defendants' evidence was that the natural drainage was
to the North (T. 195 ). Defendants' evidence did not
controvert that the County was attempting to appropriate a private drain owned by the Taylors for public use,
due to an alleged emergency situation resulting from the
accumulation of water north of the Center Street highway.
A second theory found in defendants' pre-trial statement is that the County had acquired a right, of way
through some general use over the period of years. This
''general use" was sought to be substantiated by testimony that some farmers in the immediate vicinity had
used the Taylor drain and, in fact, had purchased the
right to use it from Hance A. Taylor's father. Such evidence is clearly immaterial since any right acquired by
farmers in the area or by the "general community" could
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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not give the 8ounty a right in the a:bsence of an express
grant, and no such grant to the County was ever claimed
or suggested by the evidence. Further, the County,
through its Commissioner Carver, admitted that it was
not the agent of someone else in cleaning the drain. At
page 324 of the transcript occurs the following on recrossexamination of the witness Carver:
RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Q.

Are you saying now, Mr. Carver, the reason
you sent that dragline through there is because the people north of Center Street told
you to~

A.

Oh, no. I don't do that.

Q.

It had nothing to do with it at all~ And if the
drain needed cleaning, you would have cleaned
it whether anyone told you to or not~

A.

I think so, yes.

Q. 'The fact that the people returned there telling
you to clean the drain, that doesn't make any
difference~

A.

Yes, I think it does. When a lot of people are
complaining.

Q. It's sort of a public relation job~
A.

No. We like to do the things that should be
done at the time it's needed.

Q. Well, did you rely on what these people told
you as to whether or not this drain needs
cleaning~
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A.

Oh, no. We go look at it after they come in.

Q.

You were not cleaning it for

A.

No.

Q.

You were relying on them to determine
whether or not it needed to be cleaned~

A.

We were cleaning it for Weber County.

Q.

You use your own judg1nent in those matters,
don't you~

A.

Yes.

them~

Defendants' theory that the right of way had been
acquired by prescriptive use over a twenty year period
prompted the introduction of testimony through many
witnesses of instances where Weber County through its
employees had gone onto the Taylor farms and cleaned
the drains. This evidence when read in conjunction with
cross-examination and rebuttal testimony conclusively
shows that on each and every oecasion when defendants entered the Taylor farm for the purpose ~~f cleaning the drain, permission was sought and obtained or the
entry was made without the plaintiffs' knowledge. This
Court has frequently observed that the testimony of a
witness is no stronger than it remains after cross-examination. Further, the cleaning in recent years was theresult of a conditional permission given by the Taylors to
the County if it would tile the drain and thus prevent
its further enlargement. It was never adverse or under
claim of right.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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An element necessary for acquiring a right of way
by prescriptive use is adverse user, or a continued use
under claim of right with the acquiescence of the owner
of the servient estate. Bertolina v. Frates, 89 Ut. 238,
57 P. (2d) 346; Jen1sen v. Gerrard, 85 Ut. 481,39 P. (2d)
1070.

·~his

element is entirely lacking in the evidence.

There can be no acquiescence by the landowners in the
absence of knowledge that someone is attempting to acquire a right of way over their property. There was no
claim of right on the County's part as witness the permission consistently sought. Further, there can be no
adverse user when the evidence shows that permission
has been unconditionally or conditionally given for each
separate entry upon the servient estate by that party who
seeks to create the easement.
Since defendants introduced no testimony to controvert the ownership of the Taylor farms or the forcea:ble
entry by Weber County, it became their burden to show
that the-entry was under some claim of right. This they
sought to do by introducing evidence to the effect that a
right of"' way had been acquired by prescription. Their
burden in this regard is that they must establish their
claim by ''clear and convincing evidence," Buckley v.
Cox, 274 P. (2d) 277 (Utah, 1952), or "clear and satisfactory evidence," Jensen v. Gerra,rd, Supra. See also 2
Tiffany on Real Property, 2nd Ed., Sec. 519', page 2046.
We submit that the evidence of defendants was not of
that quality required by the Utah cases.
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II. THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTION
NO. 3, WHICH QUOTES VERBATIM FROM THE DEFENDANTS' PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT AS TO THEORIES OF DEFENSE WHICH ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY ANY EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.

The trial court in his Instruction No. 3 charged the
jury as follows:
''To this cmnplaint, the defendants answered
admitting they entered the land in question, but
alleging that they did so lawfully as and for
Weber County * * *"
The instruction goes on to recite four theories which
the defendants had proposed, any one of which they felt
would justify a finding of the acquisition of a right of
way. Paragraphs one, two and three of this instruction
are verbatim quotes from the defendants' pre-trial stateInent of facts and none of the instruction finds any support in competent evidence. Paragraph 2, containing
the statement that the people of the comm.'WYIJity had maintained the drain for 35 to 40 years or more, alleges facts
which, if true, would be immaterial. The balance of paragraph 2 relating to the maintenance of the drain iby
Weber County, while gaining some support from the
evidence, yet, if true, would not in and of itself support
a finding that a right of way had been created, absent
adverse use or acquiescence for twenty years to a claimed
right. Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Ut. 2·2, 197 P. (2d) 117.
Paragraph 3 of the instruction, as previously discussed,
is supported, if at all, by evidence in the form of hearsay
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testimony by one Lester England. Further, such ervidence, if admissible, could not create a right of way in
vVe~ber County, absent a grant from 0. G. Swenson and
Lester England's father or their successors in interest
to the County.
In Bruner v. McCarthy, et al., 105 Utah 399, 142 P.
(2d) 649, Justice Wolfe discusses at length the matter
of a trial court's reading to the jury the pleadings in a
case. At page 413, of the Utah Report, he states:
"There is nothing inherently erroneous in
reading the pleadings in order to present the issues. If they are concise, well drawn, and present
the issues sharply where there is evid~ence material to each issue, it may be that the court could
not improve upon them as a method of stating
the position of each side." (Italics ours.)
Justice Wolfe goes on to cite earlier Utah cases in
which it had been held prejudicial error for a verbatim
statement of the complaint, answer or reply to be given
the jury-1s part of their instructions, such statements being too often misleading and prejudicial. Among other
cases Ju.stice Wolfe quotes from Farmers and Mercharnt's
Savings Bank v. Jensen, 64 Utah 609, 232 P. 1084 wherein
the Supreme Court held that :
"The court in the written charge should itself
clearly define the particular issue or issues suJbmitted to the jury and should specifically state to
them the material facts alleged, denied and admitted in respect to such issues. (Citing cases.)
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But upon appeal prejudice will not be presumed
simply fron1 a showing that the trial court failed to
construe the pleadings and to charge the jury upon the issues. The burden rests upon the complaining party to go further and point out to this
court wherein and in what respect he has been
prejudiced by such error on the part of the trial
court. Davis v. Hiener, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 587."
Justice \Volfe then continues:
"While most jurisdictions frown on the practice of using the language of the various pleadings
to summarize the issues for the jury, the rule that
reading the pleadings may or may not be error
seems to meet with general approval.
~'It has been held prejudicial error to read
parts of pleadings relating to issues upon which no
evidence has been introduced, Hines v. Gale, 25
Arizona 65, 213 P. 395. * * *"

It is submitted that the trial court in quoting at
length in Instruction No. 3 from the defendants' pre-trial
statement of facts (R. 26) committed the vttry error
Justice Wolfe discusses, i.e., the reading of parts of pleadings relating to issues upon which no evidence jo,s been
introduced. This is clearly true of paragraphs one and
four, and part of paragraph two of this instruction. Certainly any jury of laymen, whose responsibility it was to
determine whether a right of way existed, would become
confused at the court's suggestion that four possible
theories existed and were supported by the evidence upon
which they could find the acquisition of a right of way by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Weber County over the farm lands of the Taylors. That
which holds true for the reading of pleadings as part of
a court's instructions would likewise hold true for the
reading of a party's pre-trial statement as part of the
instructions. Thus, as stated in Shields v. Utah Light and
Traction Co., 99 Utah 307, 315; 105 P. ('2d) 347,
"vVe conclude that the reading of the long and
involved complaint to the jury as part of the
charge was error, not altogether corrected by the
mere admonition that the foregoing is not to be
construed as evidence but merely sets forth the
claims of plaintiff."
For further references on the question whether an
instruction in the absence of evidence to support it 1s
error, see plaintiffs' Assignment of Error No. IV.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTION

NO. 6, SETTING FORTH "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DRAINAGE LAW."

The trial court's instruction No. 6 intended to ''be
helpful" in stating ''a few of the basic principles of law
governing drainage problems" erroneously states the law
with respect to the acquisition of a prescriptive right.
Paragraph four of this instruction sets forth in
Hornbook fashion what the law 'books refer to as "the
lost grant theory." The writer at 17 American J'urisprudence, Easements, Section 55, discusses the origin of
easements by prescription and in the following words
states how the theory grew up in our law:
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"Easements may be created hy prescription
or, more properly speaking, under the modern
doctrine, by presu1nption. Theoretieally, statutes
of limitations apply only to actions for the recovery of land as distinguished from incorporeal
hereditaments, such as easements. An easement
clai1ned in the land of another cannot be the subject of a constant, exclusive, and adverse possession su~h as is requisite to assert the bar of limitations. Thus, originally in England, easements,
as incorporeal hereditaments, were said to lie
wholly in grant, and statutes of limitation were
held to apply only to actions for the recovery of
land. In time the fiction of a "lost grant" was
adopted by the courts ; that i ~, the courts presumed, from the long possession and exercise of
right by the defendant with the acquiescence of
the owner, that there must have been originally
a grant by the owner to the claimant which must
have been lost."
In reading the instructions of the court as a whole,
it would seem that this "lost grant" theory of Instruction
No. 6 is something entirely different than the adverse
use theory discussed in Instruction No. 9. Both, however, are concerned with the acquisition of a right of way
by prescription. Again, the element obviously missing
in paragraph four of this instruction, is that of adverse
use, or in the alternative, acquiescence by the servient
land owner in the acts of the party seeking to establish
the right of way under claim of right. See Smith v. North
Canyon Water Compawy, 16 Ut. 194, at page 202, 52 P.
283, where the court discusses the elements necessary to
prove the acquisition of a water right by prescription.
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Since those very elements were not proved by the defendants at the trial as shown heretofore, Instruction No. 6
was not only an erroneous statement of the law, but, even
if correctly and completely stated, was not supported
by the evidence.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTION
NO. 13, THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE AT ALL IN THE
RECORD TO SUPPORT THE INSTRUCTION.

Instruction No. 13 is an instruction wholly without
support in the evidence. The Instruction reads as follows :
"If you find that 0. G. Swenson and Lester
England's father purchased from John Taylor, the
prior owner of plaintiffs' lands, the right to allow
the water from their places to be drained through
the drain across plaintiffs' land and the right to
maintain such a drain, and if you find that Lester
and Merl England are successors in interest to
the land being continuously drained since that
time through the drain in question, so as to have
a prescriptive right as elsewhere defined, and if
you find that Weber County was requested and
instructed by said En glands shortly prior to November 20, 1953, to clean out said drain in their
behalf and as their agent, then you are instructed
that said We'ber County was not a trespasser
when it did so, but that the right to so act would
not exceed the right of England would have had
and if the act did so, they would be trespassers
to the extent not justified by the right."

It will be seen that the Instruction, in substance, is one
on the theory of agency, and as heretofore stated, the
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County expressly denied at the trial, through its Commissioner Carver, that it was acting for anyone but
Weber County, in the cleaning of the Taylor drain Nove1nber 20, 1953. A clear statement of the scope of instructions is found at 64 Corpus Juris 760, where it is
stated:

1

''Instructions should be confined to the issues
presented by the evidence. Where there is no evidence upon an issue, failure to instruct upon, or
to present it, is not error. On the contrary, instructions on issues not r·aised by th1e evidence or
directly opposed to the evidence are erroneous,
G/nd properly refused although they ar;e correct
as abstract propositions of law and although the
issues are raised through the ple..adings; and it is
error to refuse to eliminate an issue made by the
pleadings when there is no evidence to support it.
If an instruction not warranted by the evidence
is calculated to mislead the jury and prejudice
the objecting party, it is ground for a reversal;
* * * (Italics ours)."
The reason for carefully guarding the giving of instructions upon which there is no evidence, is found at
14 Ruling Case Law 736, where the statement is made:
"If an instruction is not thus based on the
evidence, it is erroneous in that it introduces for
the jury facts not presented thereby, and it is well
calculated to mislead and in.duce them to suppose
that such a state of facts in the opinion of the
court w1as possible under the evidence, and might
be considered by them." (Italics ours.)
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lingshead, 82 rtah 416, 25 P. (2d) 612, at page 432, of the
Utah Reports, the Supreme Court of Utah discusses
this question as follows :
''It is proper and generally necessary for the
court in its instructions to submit to the jury the
theory of the case as presented by the defendant
as well as that presented by the plaintiff. It is
necessary, however, that whatever theories are
presented by pleadings or otherwise, in order to
be entitled to be submitted by way of instructions
to the jury, some evidence must have been received
by the court in support of such theory. Instructions to a jury must be responsive to the issues and
of such nature that they are applicable to the evidence received and submitted to the jury."
In that case the court found that there was no evidence
supporting part of an instruction and on that basis, as
well as other errors, reversed the holding of the trial
court and returned the case for a new trial.
A more recent pronouncement by Justice Wolfe, concurring in the case of Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Company, 108 Utah 577, 162 P. (2d) 759, is found at page
593:

"I note a change in the policy of this court in
regard to determining whether inapplicable instructions are prejudicial. In earlier days, this
court held that an inapplicable instruction would
be presumed to be prejudicial unless it clearly appeared that it could not have been so. (Citing
cases.) Of late, and in this case, we have held
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that an instruction not applicable to any evidence
will be presu1ned to have been ignored by the jury.
This 1neans that we will assmne that the jury rxercised 1nore discrimination than the judge. Certainly I am not one to hold that the mere giving
of abstract instructions not applicable to any evidence necessarily constitutes prejudicial error.
Trial judges under the pressures put upon them
by jury trials give instructions at the time thought
to be applicable, which we, in a careful survey
1nay find inapplicable."
Justice vVolfe goes on to state that there are two
types of inapplicable instructions. One is the harmless
kind, which a jury could reasonably ignore. The other
kind is discussed by J'ustice Wolfe at page 596:
"This case presents an example of one erroneous instruction which may be held not prejudicial. I refer to that instruction in respect to what
I consider a non-applicable ordinance hitherto
considered. It also presents in the instruction being presently considered an excellent example of
one which is prejudicial.
"The mind of the jury would be pointedly directed to the fact that the judge considered that
there was evidence from which it could be concluded that the plaintiff had fallen into the vault
because of lack of protection from the South Side.
The instruction was actually calculated to do that.
Yet the accident definitely was caused by the
plaintiff not falling into the hole, but actually
walking against a raised barrier, falling over itan act in itself strongly indicative of lack of care
for his own protection. To divert the mind of the
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jury fron1 a chain of circun1stances which culminated in the accident to a false chain on which could
be predicated a conclusion of different and perhaps greater culpability on the part of the defendant when both true and false chains themselves
were so closely connected with the same physical
object and the manner in which the accident happened may, with great likelihood, have influenced
the jury to base a conclusion on the supposed more
culpable delict. The differences between the two
situations may at first appear trivial but upon
reflection may reveal a very marked difference
* * * Their minds may too easily, without a wrong
instruction to help them, import into the situation
a fall into the unprotected hole, rather than a
blind stumbling over an obstacle and their verdict
reached accordingly. Add to that probability an
instruction which is predicated on the misstep into
the hole rather than the fall over a door and the
likelihood that they were influenced by it is very
greatly magnified. * • *"
The above reasoning applies with equal force in the
instant case. The jury were to decide by answering the
special interrogatories with the aid of instructions,
whether Weber County was upon the plaintiffs' farms by
any legal right. The instructions contain several theories which, if supported by the evidence, might have
given Weber County and its employees a legal right of
way over the Taylor drain. But the record reveals that
no one theory is supported by the evidence, and most
decidedly, the theory of agency. Instruction No. 13, setting forth a separate theory which defendants unsuccessfully attempted to bolster by evidence, tends only to con-
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fuse the jury, or, at best, to suggest to them, without
supporting facts, an additional theory upon which they
can justify the County's entrance upon the Taylor farms.
The likelihood that the jury were influenced by it is highly probable and the giving of the instruction was thus,
prejudicial to plaintiffs.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS REFUSAL TO
SUSTAIN PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE TESTIMONY
OF WITNESS LESTER ENGLAND, AND FURTHER ERRED
IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS LESTER ENGLAND AS TO
CERTAIN MATTERS.

The trial court permitted the defendants' witness,
Lester England, to testify over objection concerning a
staten1ent made by said witnesses' father, now deceased,
many years before and in the absence of any of the plaintiffs of this case. The statement appears at page 189 of
the transcript as follows:

Q.

What do you know about the

A.

Just that my father told me.

transaction~

J

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I object to what his
father told him. That isn't binding on us.

Q.

Maybe it is.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
foundation for it.

Q.

Then establish a

Where were you when your father made these
statements to you~
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A.

Well, one time we were right here on this
drain here.

Q.

Now, you are indicating what~

A.

'The main drain that goes through Taylors'
places.

Q.

Yes.

A.

And he told me he said "they can't stop you
from cleaning tha:t drain because we bought
a right-of-way at one time."

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I move the answer be
stricken as not responsive to any question asked,
and on the further ground that it's hearsay as to
any of the parties to this-the plaintiffs in this
case, no proper foundation for the admission at
this time.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
It may remain. It shows hostile assertions to the
T'aylors.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, he
hasn't shown that John Taylor was there. He
hasn't shown the plaintiffs were there. He hasn''t
shown it's a reputation. All he said is that it's
shown that his father said that to him. I don't
think that is material to this case. It's certainly
hearsay.
THE COURT: The matters you refer toI judge is what he has got is circumstantial evidence of an adverse claim.
,MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well one isolated
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statement isn't any evidence of hostility or anything else if it isn't a general reputation in that
area. It's absolutely immaterial.
The transcript reveals that at this point counsel for
the Coun:ty stated that an exception to the ordinary hearsay rule existed as a result of a whole series of boundary
line and land cases before the time when surveyors were
able to get out on the lands, based on some theory of law
not stated in the record by counsel, and yet, an exception
to the hearsay rule reportedly allowed ''in many English
and A1nerican cases." We know of no such exception to
the hearsay rule. If defendants' counsel refers to the exception treated at 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.)
§ 1563, entitled "Declarations About Private Boundaries,"
it is submitted that no question of boundary existed in
the instant case.
This statement by the witness Lester England is
clearly hearsay and should have been stricken by the
court at the request of counsel for the plaintiffs. At page
281 of the transcript, the trial court discusses and rules
upon plaintiffs' motion to strike the entire testimony of
Lester England with respect to the conversation between
him and his father, as hearsay, there being no foundation
showing that such knowledge as the father had was a part
of the general knowledge of the com·munity. Counsel
further objected that even if there were such a conversation it would relate to the right of Mr. England, that is,
the witnesses' predecessor in title, and not to the rights
of the defendants; and further o'bjected on the ground
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that .Mr. Lester England's testimony relating to the payment of any money to John H. Taylor has no connection
with the case since there is no showing that any of those
rights had been assigned to the defendants in this case.
The court states at page 281:
"Insofar as this business a;bout conversations with Mr. England and his father, it's admissi'ble, if for no other purpose to show how Mr.
England viewed the matter. I recognize the England's do have a right, that there is no showing
directly that the county has picked up his right
and acted as his agent as such. There is some
evidence of it, but it would affect damages anyway. That water had a right to run down there.
It had a right to run down there. He can't complain if Weber County ran it down there at Mr.
England's request, or whether Mr. England ran it
down there. I think the evidence is admiss~ble
'for many purposes. First you will be aible to
argue to the jury the phases of it you have asserted in here.
"Why don't you bring this Wigmore with you
tomorrow on this business about the rule of law."
It is apparent from the above quotation that the trial
court in his search for some basis for admitting the testimony of Lester England, found none at all, and could
only state in summary:
•'I think the evidence is admissible for many
purposes."
Certainly the error of the trial court's refusal to
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strike this inadmissible testin1ony cannot be remedied
by telling counsel : "You will be able to argue the jury
the phases of it you have asserted in here." A reading
of the record will readily disclose the harmful effect of
Lester England's testimony to plaintiffs' case. This was
the only witness through whom evidence was introduced
concerning any right of way over the Taylor property
purportedly acquired by others than the Taylors themselves. The jury, being permitted to speculate on this
incmnpetent and inadmissible evidence, could readily
jun1p to the conclusion that if a grant of a right of way
were given by the Taylors' predecessors to the Englands,
possibly through some mysterious means, it could have
descended to Weber County. We submit thai the failure
to strike this testimony from the record constituted
prejudicial error.

The court's instructions were misleading and confusing to the jury and contained erroneous statements of
law. Further, the court suggested to the jury theories
of defense entirely unsupported by the evidence in the
case. Finally, the court adn1itted into evidence and refused to strike testimony clearly hearsay and immaterial
to the issue as to whether Weber County had acquired a
right of way by prescription, by grant, or otherwise, and
which testimony was highly prejudicial to plaintiffs.
The cumulative effect of these errors was to deprive
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sultant effect that the plaintiffs have been unlawfully deprived of their right of private property by the action
of Weber County.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should
be reversed and a new trial ordered with instructions to
direct a verdict for plaintiffs on the issue of liability and
permanently enjoining any further trespass on plaintiffs'
lands by We'ber County.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, THURMAN,
WORSLEY & SNOW
and H. G. OHRIS:T'ENS'EN
Attorneys for .dppellClftls.
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